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REASONABLE RAGE: THE PROBLEM WITH 
STEREOTYPES IN PROVOCATION CASES 
NICOLE A.K. MATLOCK

 
INTRODUCTION 
There is nothing reasonable about killing out of anger. Rage—not 
reason—is the controlling emotion and the corresponding thought process 
in such a killing. Nevertheless, criminal jurisprudence in the United States 
has carved out a niche for a killer’s passions, under the guise of 
“reasonableness,” and rage is the primary passion recognized by the law to 
alter a conviction. The doctrine of provocation is the avenue by which rage 
is legitimated. A court may accept those passions, sympathize with a 
defendant’s rage, and reduce a conviction from murder to voluntary 
manslaughter.  
Voluntary manslaughter is certainly no small conviction.
1
 It requires 
that: 
(1) The provocation to which the actor responds must have been 
adequate; (2) The killing must have occurred while the actor was in 
the “heat of passion”; (3) The actor must have lost self-control, and 
his loss of self-control must have been reasonable, such that a 
reasonable person in the actor’s situation would likewise have lost 
control and killed; and (4) The defense afforded to an actor who 
satisfies the conditions identified in (1) through (3) is a partial 
defense.  It mitigates murder to manslaughter, but does not provide 
a full or complete defense.
2
 
There are several theories of how provocation works, but the elements 
listed above remain constant. The underlying question is “whether the 
 
 
  Executive Articles Editor, Washington University Jurisprudence Review; J.D. (2014), 
Washington University School of Law. 
 1. See Stephen P. Garvey, Passion’s Puzzle, 90 IOWA L. REV. 1677, 1737 (2005) (explaining 
how voluntary manslaughter recognizes the horror of the crime, without the intent that a jury finds to 
be absent). 
 2. Id. at 1687 (citations omitted). The Model Penal Code (“MPC”) melds provocation with 
diminished capacity to form the defense of Extreme Mental and Emotional Disturbance (“EMED”). 
Under EMED, murder is mitigated to manslaughter if the killing took place “under the influence of 
extreme mental or emotional disturbance for which there is reasonable explanation or excuse.” Id. at 
1689 (citation omitted). Under diminished capacity, no provocation is needed. Diminished capacity 
refers to psychological abnormalities in actors of violence and the “reasonable” standard does not 
apply. Id. at 1738–39. 
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actor’s loss of self-control can be understood in terms that arouse 
sympathy in the ordinary citizen.”3 It is a lesser offense than murder 
because it lacks murder’s element of intent. The distinction between the 
presence and lack of intent perpetuates false stereotypes and unjustly 
blames victims for offenders’ actions. There should be no legal distinction 
between intentional murder and a voluntary, “provoked” killing. 
Scholars presume that it is possible for a human being to become so 
enraged as to lose all control of one’s actions.4 The scholar Stephen 
Garvey
5
 has analyzed the main theories of provocation, identified 
problems in each theory, and attempted to correct inconsistencies.
6
 Under 
Garvey’s notion of provocation, the actor’s rage or desire is theoretically 
so great that the actor cannot control it, and “no matter how hard he tries 
or were to try, such control cannot reasonably be expected of him.”7 But 
do such reactions really occur? And whether or not it is possible to lose 
control in that way, can a jury reasonably recognize provocation as a 
factor in any defendant’s case? 
I argue that the claimed “loss of control” is not an actual loss of control 
and that citizens (and juries) nevertheless recognize it because of 
stereotypes ingrained in our culture. I further argue that it is impossible for 
a jury to ascertain whether loss of control is a possibility and, if so, 
whether loss of control actually occurred. Such knowledge is unattainable 
 
 
 3. Id. at 1690 (citation omitted). 
 4. Even scholars who claim that individuals are responsible for their emotions recognize a loss 
of control. Some assert: 
[P]anic and rage may be remarkable in the limited rationality of the judgments in question as 
well as the intensity of the response. But we nevertheless make these judgments and as such 
the emotion falls within the realm of the voluntary, even if we cannot act or feel other than 
we do. 
EIMEAR SPAIN, THE ROLE OF EMOTIONS IN CRIMINAL LAW DEFENCES: DURESS, NECESSITY, AND 
LESSER EVILS 267 (2011) (quoting ROBERT C. SOLOMON, NOT PASSION’S SLAVE: EMOTIONS AND 
CHOICE 214 (2003). 
 5. Stephen Garvey is a leading scholar advocating to preserve the provocation doctrine. 
 6. Garvey describes provocation as: 
The heat of passion (anger) arising from the provocation constitutes, generates, or intensifies 
a desire to kill strong or intense enough to be completely but temporarily beyond the actor’s 
ability to control it. . . . The desire acts on its own, so to speak, without any intervening act of 
will, causing the fatal movement of the actor’s body. 
Garvey, supra note 1, at 1701 (citation omitted). 
 7. Id. (footnote omitted). Garvey also acknowledges provocation’s possible shortcomings of 
producing false negatives and positives in court. He asserts that because a jury may be convinced that 
a defendant’s rage was reasonable when it may not be, the doctrine has the potential to give “false 
positives” in the courtroom. Id. at 1735. Since a jury is prevented by the doctrine from finding 
provocation in the absence of “adequate provocation,” then the doctrine also has the potential problem 
of resulting in a “false negative” when a defendant might in fact have acted outside his full capacity 
for control. Id. at 1736. 
https://openscholarship.wustl.edu/law_jurisprudence/vol6/iss2/5
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because the personal experiences of each juror inhibit their ability to 
empathize with the defendant to the point of actually believing that one 
can become so enraged as to lose control. 
The stereotypes that can change murder convictions to “voluntary 
manslaughter” originate from the same perceptions of anger and 
entitlement that surround domestic violence and sexual assault. These 
stereotypes live in our imaginations, and in the imagination of each juror. 
When juries sympathize with defendants, their learned stereotypes, which 
formed their conceptions of human capacities, come into play. 
This paper will critically examine the plausibility of loss of control by 
demonstrating inconsistencies in the provocation doctrine and the 
detrimental effect that learned stereotypes have on juror decision-making. 
Part I presents a historical overview of the provocation defense beginning 
with its English common law roots.
8
 Part II delves into the provocation 
doctrine’s elements with greater specificity, examining some of the 
predominant theories of provocation and their inconsistencies—many of 
which scholars have brought to light but have reconciled in a less than 
satisfactory manner.
9
 Part III explores recent studies in cognitive science 
and philosophy that present serious doubt that a human being’s rage ever 
results in the loss of control over one’s actions.10 Part IV addresses 
specific problems with provocation’s “reasonable person” standard. Part V 
demonstrates how the same stereotypes upon which the provocation 
 
 
 8. The difference in the origins compared with the current use of the doctrine indicate an 
inconsistency that should reasonably produce doubt as to whether the “loss of control” claim is at all 
plausible. As Part I explains, the original “excuses” for murder were finding one’s wife in the act of 
adultery or seeing someone raping one’s son. Neither of these provided a mere excuse because of an 
out-of-control rage. Rather, killing in those instances was an honorable response. Done out of honor, 
such killing derived from the duties of a “real man” and was praised. It was not an involuntary 
impulse. 
 9. For the sake of consistency and logic, if it is in fact possible to lose control over one’s 
actions, and the loss-of-control defense seeks to lower the culpability of those who kill while under the 
control of their rage and not their own logical conclusions, then the provocation that led to a 
defendant’s actions should not need to be “adequate.” It would be fair to include in the provocation 
doctrine any individuals who did not have full control over their actions. There is stark inconsistency 
in the doctrine of provocation as a “loss of control” defense when compared to the law’s treatment of 
heinous crimes that might seem more likely to be the result of “loss of control,” but the justification is 
not considered to be “reasonable.” The fact that provocation requires reasonable justification 
demonstrates that actions to which the provocation led are more likely to result from a feeling of 
justification and entitlement to punish the victim. This analysis includes some discussion of the victim 
blaming inherent in the requirement for “adequate provocation.” 
 10. See Stephen J. Morse, Culpability and Control, 142 U. PA. L. REV. 1587 (1994). Psychology 
Professor Stephen Morse analyzes the inner-workings of what we call the “loss of control” element, 
which reveals that the core of the doctrine is more along the lines of “cutting a break” for a defendant 
who had been under stress, not a serious recognition of the absence of choice. 
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doctrine is founded have been disproved in other contexts.
11
 These 
analyses culminate in Part VI to explain how a jury’s lack of sympathy for 
a defendant who claims loss of control precludes a jury from rightly 
finding provocation’s existence in any particular case.12 
I. THE HISTORY OF CRIMES OF PASSION 
In the origins of provocation, a man was not liable for murder if he: (1) 
found his wife in the act of adultery, or (2) found someone buggering his 
son (forcible sodomy). Though these circumstances were considered 
“excuses,” the actor’s honor was ultimately at stake.13 In the seventeenth 
century (and earlier) in England, a man of “natural honor” was expected to 
respond violently to an offender, without reluctance or hesitation. He was 
completely justified in responding violently to the provocation with 
anger.
14
 Such response was the fulfillment of a duty, not an accident. The 
anger expressed by a man of honor, then, was not supposed to result in a 
“loss of control.” Rather, his anger was expected to result in violence to fit 
the provocation, which was the offense against him. The violence was thus 
deemed to be rational and appropriate by the culture and the actor.
15
 If, 
however, the violent response was slightly out of proportion to the 
provocation, then the actor was convicted of manslaughter.
16
 If the 
violence was grossly excessive compared with the provocative act, then 
the killing was murder.
17
 If an actor was provoked, then, but responded in 
 
 
 11. In particular, loss of control is often claimed by domestic violence perpetrators when they 
beat their wives or girlfriends. Although it is possible for a wife or girlfriend to be the perpetrator of 
domestic abuse, and such cases are all the more serious for their infrequency, for purposes of this 
paper, I will treat domestic abuse mainly as men’s action against women. The majority of domestic 
violence cases do present a male perpetrator and a female victim. 
 12. The fact that the law provides the possibility of recognizing an out-of-control response 
prompts the jury to activate and apply its learned social stereotypes, in spite of the disconnect between 
what the standard they apply to themselves and those they know and that which they apply to an 
unknown defendant. 
 13. Joshua Dressler, Why Keep the Provocation Defense?: Some Reflections on a Difficult 
Subject, 86 MINN. L. REV. 959, 970 (2002) [hereinafter Dressler, Reflections]. 
 14. Id. 
 15. Id. Joshua Dressler summarizes that, “[t]he hot-blooded response of the man of honor was 
not an out-of-control response to an affront, but was a morally justified hot-blooded and controlled 
rational retaliation in proportion to the nature and degree of provocation involved.” Id. (emphasis 
omitted). 
 16. Id. 
 17. Id. In some ways, this is similar to the current provocation doctrine. Current law does not 
allow for retaliation, but only for self-defense. The difference would be any recognition of what is 
grossly disproportionate and what is slightly excessive. The important thing to note with this historical 
insight, however, is that the violent action was not considered to be accidental or the result of lost 
control; it was a rational result of the justifiable anger. 
https://openscholarship.wustl.edu/law_jurisprudence/vol6/iss2/5
  
 
 
 
 
2014] REASONABLE RAGE 375 
 
 
 
 
unreasonable outrage, then even if the provocation was justified, the act 
was murder. The law did not allow room for “out of control” responses. 
Today, at common law, provocation that results in a “loss of control” 
by the actor transforms a murder conviction into voluntary manslaughter. 
Provocation is present when an individual kills in the “heat of passion” 
resulting from adequate provocation that led to a reasonable loss of self-
control.
18
 The Model Penal Code (“MPC”) distinguishes murder from 
voluntary manslaughter by level of intent. For voluntary manslaughter, the 
MPC requires that the offender lack the substantial capacity to conform his 
conduct to the law’s requirements.19 
Within the provocation doctrine, there is an objective and a subjective 
component. The objective element is that a jury should consider the 
“reasonableness of the provoking event regardless of whether it fit any sort 
of predetermined category of provocations.”20 Subjectively, 
reasonableness is determined “from the viewpoint of a person in the 
actor’s situation under the circumstances as he believes them to be.”21 
Considering an abuser’s circumstances “as he believes them to be” would 
take into account an abuser’s feeling of entitlement that may seem to 
justify an otherwise unreasonable outrage. So at first glance, the MPC 
seems to use an objective standard, but the definition of “reasonableness” 
is subjective. That subjectivity allows more juror discretion than ever 
before.
22
 Increased juror discretion can lead to the perpetuation of harmful 
stereotypes of a man’s incapacity for control. More objective standards, on 
the other hand, could help effect change and reduce the influence of 
cultural expectations and stereotypes.  
Our current understanding of provocation, and its application to jilted 
or controlling men, is grounded in cultural principles dating back to the 
 
 
 18. Garvey, supra note 1, at 1687. 
 19. MODEL PENAL CODE § 4.01 (Proposed Official Draft 1962). The Model Penal Code has also 
expanded the doctrine to include “extreme mental or emotional disturbance.” MODEL PENAL CODE 
§ 210.03. 
 20. Susan D. Rozelle, Controlling Passion: Adultery and the Provocation Defense, 37 RUTGERS 
L.J. 197, 202 (2005). 
 21. Id. (citation omitted). 
 22. Emily L. Miller, (Wo)manslaughter: Voluntary Manslaughter, Gender, and the Model Penal 
Code, 50 EMORY L.J. 665, 669 (2001). This heightened jury discretion is sometimes viewed as 
positive. The average juror will be able to relate to the common understanding of what is “reasonable” 
provocation. However, as this paper will later address, the average juror may also have biases and 
stereotypes which contribute to the failure to justly punish a defendant, so giving a jury more 
discretion could perpetuate stereotypes that hinder the pursuit of justice (both for the accused and for 
the victim). 
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start of the twentieth century.
23
 Those cultural principles have continued to 
grow and hinder justice for women in even more ways. At early common 
law, a man was found guilty of murder when he discovered the infidelity 
of his fiancé but not upon discovering the infidelity of his wife. A fiancé 
had not yet become the “property of the offender” until marriage.24 
Today, however, jilted fiancés and boyfriends can also successfully 
claim provocation. Current law does not distinguish between a wife, 
fiancée, or girlfriend. “Reasonableness” has come to include these 
relationships in which men feel a sense of entitlement and property in their 
girlfriend or spouse.
25
 
There is significant scholarly debate on how the doctrine of 
provocation works and how it is to be interpreted. Several scholars, 
particularly feminist scholars, have advocated for an abolition or 
modification of the doctrine. Some seek its abolition because it creates 
undesirable outcomes.
26
 For this and other reasons, the Victoria Law 
Reform Commission recommended an abolition of the provocation 
defense.
27
 Other scholars oppose abolition but have proposed alterations to 
 
 
 23. In Douglas v. Florida, 652 So. 2d 887 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1995), the defendant claimed loss 
of control resulting from provocation. In its analysis, the court referred to cases detailing the 
provocation defense from 1912 and 1916—before women even had the right to vote. Id. at 889–90. 
 24. Miller, supra note 22, at 673. In 1982, Joshua Dressler noted this discrepancy between 
treatment of unfaithful spouses or lovers, and his response was that, “[i]t is implausible to believe that 
when an actor observes his or her loved one in an act of sexual disloyalty, that actor will suffer from 
less anger simply because the disloyal partner is not the actor's spouse.” Joshua Dressler, Rethinking 
Heat of Passion: A Defense in Search of a Rationale, 73 J. CRIM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 421, 440 (1982). 
I instead side with the feminist scholars who observe the undertones of “property rights” in the 
different treatment between spouses and lovers, and I would therefore argue that property, not level of 
anger was the source of the different treatment. 
 25. It is interesting that in an age where women are no longer viewed as property in a legal sense, 
men’s feelings of entitlement have spread to non-marital romantic relationships. Violence against 
women continues to be a problem in our culture. The particular issue of entitlement and how it relates 
to the provocation doctrine is explained in greater detail in Parts V and VI of this paper. 
 26. Many male defendants claim provocation because their wife or girlfriend committed adultery 
or ended their relationship. The prevalence of intimate partner homicides is of particular import to 
feminist scholarship and to the continuing concern relating to domestic violence. See generally 
Victoria Nourse, Passion’s Progress: Modern Law Reform and the Provocation Defense, 106 Yale 
L.J. 1331 (1997). 
 27. SPAIN, supra note 4, at 71. The Victoria Law Reform Commission is an independent, 
government-funded organization that develops, reviews, and recommends reforms for Victoria, 
Australia’s state laws. The functions of the Victoria Law Reform Commission are: (1) to make law 
reform recommendations on matters referred to it by the Attorney-General; (2) to make 
recommendations on minor legal issues of general community concern; (3) to suggest to the Attorney-
General that he or she refer a law reform issue to the Commission; (4) to educate the community on 
areas of law relevant to the Commission's work; and (5) to monitor and coordinate law reform activity 
in Victoria. More information is available at VICTORIA LAW REFORM COMMISSION, http://www.law 
reform.vic .gov.au/ (last visited May 10, 2014). 
https://openscholarship.wustl.edu/law_jurisprudence/vol6/iss2/5
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the doctrine to improve its results, or to at least make its philosophical 
underpinnings more palatable.
28
  
II. INCONSISTENCY WITHIN THE DOCTRINE 
Scholars differ widely in their interpretations of the provocation 
doctrine. Stephen Garvey has laid out the main tenets of each theory and 
explained some of the difficulties with each of them. The main contrasting 
theories are: (1) provocation as a partial excuse, and (2) provocation as a 
partial justification.
29
 The partial excuse theory focuses on the partial 
incapacity of the defendant to control his actions at the time of the crime. 
His actions are excused to the extent that he could not control them. The 
partial justification theory focuses on the adequacy of the provocations. 
The defendant’s rage was inflamed because of a serious wrong committed 
against him.
30
 
A jury considers the provocation doctrine as a combination of partial 
excuse and partial justification. The so-called loss of control must follow 
“adequate” provocation to justify the defendant’s violent response. This 
combination of justification and excuse is what complicates the doctrine. 
To require “adequate” provocation indicates that the doctrine is not just 
about a loss of control. The requirements of the doctrine would prevent 
anyone from claiming provocation where the event would not have 
angered most people to the point of violence. The “adequately” provoked 
actor’s failure to exercise self-control is reasonable, while the 
“inadequately” provoked actor’s failure is unreasonable.31  
Further complications arise when scholars contemplate how much 
discretion juries should enjoy. Joshua Dressler, an advocate of the 
provocation doctrine, points out that the constitutional framers 
incorporated the Sixth Amendment’s right to trial by jury to capture a 
jury’s “common-sense” judgment and sympathy.32 A jury is better 
qualified than a lawyer or judge to determine whether the community 
accepts the defendant’s expression of anger as reasonable.33 
 
 
 28. See generally Garvey, supra note 1 (analyzing the elements of provocation and presenting a 
nuanced way of viewing the doctrine’s effectiveness); Nourse, supra note 24 (proposing that the 
doctrine should be limited when the provocation would have resulted in a prison sentence in our 
society); Dressler, Reflections, supra note 14 (defending the doctrine against feminist arguments and 
arguing against Nourse’s proposals). 
 29. Garvey, supra note 1, at 1691. 
 30. Id. at 1691–92. 
 31. Id. at 1709. 
 32. Dressler, Reflections, supra note 14, at 980. 
 33. Id. at 981. 
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Scholar Victoria Nourse, on the other hand, advocates that the law 
recognize “adequate” provocation only when the provocation itself was a 
crime that could result in a prison sentence.
34
 Nourse argues that officially 
recognized provocations should be the standard, not what the average jury 
would find angering. She argues that the law is contradictory when it 
“refuses to embrace a sense of outrage which is necessary to the law’s 
rationalization of its own use of violence.”35 When the law does not jail 
adulterers, there is an opposite contradiction: we then ask why private 
parties may enforce a sense of outrage that society does not embrace in the 
form of legislation.
36
 Altering the standard in this way may bar many, if 
not most, provocation claims in cases of intimate partner homicide.
37
 
Dressler’s response is that provocation does not necessarily declare the 
defendant’s anger “justifiable” in the sense that society approves of his 
actions.
38
 Rather, we excuse his actions out of sympathy. The law makes a 
concession for ordinary human frailty.
39
 The question is whether “the 
provocative event might cause an ordinary person . . . to become enraged 
or otherwise emotionally overcome.”40 More than that, though, the “heat 
of passion” requirement assesses an offender’s relative values as well. 
Scholars Dan Kahan and Martha Nussbaum point out:  
If a man dispassionately killed his wife’s paramour . . . we would 
suspect that his beliefs about what is important are skewed: the 
absence of anger would show us that he invests too little value in 
fidelity; his acts of killing without anger would show us that he 
invests too little value in others’ lives.41  
A key component of provocation, then, is whether the provocation 
would have caused a “reasonable” person to become emotionally 
overcome.
42
 Nourse’s main concern is that factoring in the “reasonable 
 
 
 34. Nourse, supra note 26, at 1395. Nourse emphasizes the frequency of intimate partner 
homicide, which is most often exercised against women who end relationships or commit infidelity. 
 35. Id. at 1396. 
 36. Id. at 1396–97. 
 37. Id. at 1396. “It would not be enough for a defendant to claim that a divorce or a protective 
order or moving out caused her rage.” Id. 
 38. Dressler, Reflections, supra note 14, at 972. 
 39. Id. at 973. 
 40. Id. at 973 (citation omitted). 
 41. Dan M. Kahan & Martha C. Nussbaum, Two Conceptions of Emotion in Criminal Law, 96 
COLUM. L. REV. 269, 316 (1996) (footnote omitted). 
 42. To be clear, the only emotion recognized by the provocation doctrine is anger. That 
limitation is also an indication of inconsistencies related to the doctrine. “A major challenge for the 
law is to formulate a compelling reason why it facilitates either partial or complete exculpation on the 
basis of some emotions such as anger but not others such as fear.” SPAIN, supra note 4, at 66. One 
https://openscholarship.wustl.edu/law_jurisprudence/vol6/iss2/5
  
 
 
 
 
2014] REASONABLE RAGE 379 
 
 
 
 
outrage” of one whose spouse ends their relationship “asks us to share in 
the idea that [a spouse’s] leaving merits outrage, a claim that finds no 
reflection in the law’s mirror.”43 “Adequate” provocation would be that 
which citizens agree (through the legislative process) warrants “outrage” 
sufficient to overcome the defendant emotionally. Dressler, on the other 
hand, would leave what is “reasonable” in the hands of the jury. A jury is 
prompted to view the world from the eyes of the defendant, not necessarily 
what they would actually expect from themselves or their spouses under 
similar circumstances. This key discretion in the hands of the jury 
perpetuates the stereotypes about defendants and victims that may reside 
in the mind (perhaps the subconscious) of each member. These stereotypes 
persist in our culture even after legislative bodies have officially removed 
them from the law. It is often desirable to allow juries to be guided by 
cultural norms, but when those norms perpetuate inaccurate stereotypes 
and gender biases that ultimately deny victims justice, it is more desirable 
to reduce the risk that juries will be governed by those stereotypes. For 
example, adultery was once widely punishable as a crime. Though it is no 
longer recognized as a criminal act, adultery is presumed to present a 
moral outrage in the majority of citizens today.  
If one claims to lose control and become “overwhelmed” by one’s 
emotions, adequate provocation must be sufficient to “justify” the ensuing 
violence. Though this does not necessarily pull the rug from under the 
provocation doctrine, the presence of the “justified” requirement shows an 
inconsistent and illogical aspect to the doctrine. It is implausible that only 
what a jury decides was an “adequate” provocation (or provocation period) 
can produce overwhelming emotions in the defendant.
44
 Excused behavior 
is generally recognized as that which is not motivated by a sense of 
justice, but rather came about with no prior exercise of judgment. That 
absence of prior judgment makes it unreasonable.
45
 
As part of his theory of the provocation doctrine (called the “akrasia 
theory”), Garvey posits that the reason for the “adequate” provocation 
 
 
explanation may be taken from Garvey’s stance on “adequate provocation.” The narrowing of 
admissible provocation emotions to anger, like the narrowing of admissible provocation to that which 
is “adequate,” serves an evidentiary purpose if nothing else. Loss of control after experiencing an 
emotion other than rage is less likely to be found reasonable, so it is not presented as an option for a 
reasonable jury to find loss of control as a result of such an emotion. See Garvey, supra note 1. And 
like perceptions of “adequate” provocation, perceptions of extreme emotions and their consequences 
are grounded in stereotypes. 
 43. Nourse, supra note 26, at 1392. 
 44. Kahan & Nussbaum, supra note 41, at 306. 
 45. MARKUS DIRK DUBBER, THE SENSE OF JUSTICE: EMPATHY IN LAW AND PUNISHMENT 131 
(2006). 
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requirement is that a “loss of control” claim is more believable if the actor 
had a provocation that would induce great anger in the majority of 
people.
46
 If that is the case, then the legislature’s adoption of the 
“adequate” element in provocation is an evidentiary matter. The 
“adequate” requirement is a filter through which the jury examines proof 
that a killer did or did not possess the requisite “malicious” intent to be 
convicted of murder. If this is the rationale behind the “adequate” 
requirement, then the requirement commandeers the jury’s fact-finding 
duty. Regardless of what the jury believes about the defendant’s volition at 
the time of the killing, before provocation can reduce the conviction to 
manslaughter, the jury must find that the provocation was “adequate” and 
reasonable.  
Here lies the difficulty of “false negatives,” which may come about if 
we accept loss-of-control claims. Assuming the jury has the discretion to 
determine what is “reasonable,” it would be more consistent to permit the 
jury to decide whether a defendant lost control without requiring 
“adequate” provocation as a means of vetting out the loss of control 
claims. The requirement for “adequacy” interferes with the jury’s fact-
finding duty. 
The provocation defense is inconsistent with the way in which criminal 
law often addresses “heinous” crimes, which may sometimes arise from an 
“inadequate” trigger that provokes the criminal actor. A successful 
provocation claim requires that the trigger or provocation that led to the 
criminal act be reasonably justified. So the loss of control must follow 
from a provocation that would reasonably cause rage in the average 
reasonable person. Only then may a judge or jury conclude that the act 
occurred outside the control of the actor. 
In contrast, if an offender’s actions are prompted by a seemingly minor 
provocation, which an average person may not find enraging, the heinous 
act is declared “savage” and completely unjustified,47 and the actor is 
labeled a “monster.” For example, in October of 2012, Elizabeth Escalona 
of Dallas, Texas, was sentenced to ninety-nine years in prison for severely 
 
 
 46. Garvey, supra note 1, at 1733. Under Garvey’s akrasia theory, a provocation is adequate if 
social norms would permit a non-lethal violent response, or at least some form of overt response. The 
problem remains that “social norms” rule the day, and a jury’s conception of “social norms” is largely 
determined by stereotypes and their subconscious notions of what is appropriate. Social norms 
permitting a violent response to something that is not otherwise punishable still allows juries to be 
influenced. Id. 
 47. Molly Hennessy-Fiske, Texas Mom Gets 99 Years for Beating, Super-gluing Girl’s Hands, 
L.A. TIMES, Oct. 12, 2012, http://articles.latimes.com/2012/oct/12/nation/la-na-nn-mother-sentencing -
hands-glued-20121012. 
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beating her two-year-old daughter.
48
 This beating occurred after the child 
made a mistake during potty training. Presiding Judge Mitchell stated at 
the sentencing, “On September 7, 2011, you savagely beat your child to 
the edge of death. For this you must be punished.”49 During the trial, the 
prosecutor portrayed Elizabeth Escalona as a “monster” and sought a long 
prison sentence.
50
 
There is a significant discrepancy between the positions of giving a 
harsh punishment when provocation seems inadequate and lessening an 
offense when the provocation is deemed “adequate.” Elizabeth Escalona’s 
extreme actions still had a triggering factor, however, and seem more 
likely to have resulted from a loss of control because of the abnormality of 
her behavior. Is it reasonable, then, to exclude these individuals from the 
provocation defense when their acts might too have resulted from a loss of 
control?  
As Kahan and Nussbaum observe in their analysis of the “mechanistic 
conception” of emotions: 
[We have a sense] that emotions are external to the self, forces that 
do something to “us” without being (or at least without clearly 
being) parts of what we think of as ourselves. Anger, for example, 
can seem to come boiling up from nowhere, in ways of which “we” 
strongly disapprove.
51
  
If voluntary manslaughter is a lesser crime than murder on the premise 
that the actor loses control and acts in a way that he or she would “strongly 
disapprove,” then the same claim should apply to those who appear 
overcome with rage for less understandable reasons yet who might also 
 
 
 48. Id. This was not a murder case, as the child did not die from the beating. See id. The main 
point of discussing the case is to demonstrate a situation where loss of control might have occurred, 
but the provocation was so inadequate that the prosecutor and the judge in the case used language such 
as “savagely” and “monster.” The provocation doctrine prevents such labeling of defendants who had 
what we deem to be “adequate” provocation. 
 49. Mom Gets 99 Years in Prison for Beating Tot, Gluing Hands, ASSOCIATED PRESS, Oct. 12, 
2012, http://www.yourhoustonnews.com/courier/news/mom-gets-years-in-prison-for-beating-tot-gluing-
hands/article_e756b08d-b37a-569c-8b46-966925c2a0a6.html.  
 50. Id. The prosecutor stated, “[y]ou can give [the defendant’s children] peace, so that when 
they're sitting around the dinner table at Thanksgiving with their big family, they're not worried that 
their mother is going to come walking through the door.” Id. The defense argued that Elizabeth 
Escalona was a “train wreck” before the attack. Id. She came from a broken home, suffered abuse in 
her life, then became involved with illegal drugs and associated with gang members. She gave birth to 
her first child at the age of fourteen. In answering her own question, “[w]hat is justice for [the child 
victim],” the defense stated, “[g]iving Elizabeth the opportunity to be a better mother, giving her the 
opportunity to get counseling services, will be justice for [her child].” Id. 
 51. Kahan & Nussbaum, supra note 41, at 280. 
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strongly disapprove of their actions. Who is to say that Elizabeth Escalona 
did not “strongly disapprove” of her own conduct when she became 
angry? 
While we punish harshly for crimes we think are outrageous, the legal 
system is not so outraged by the number of women killed because they 
terminated a relationship. Domestic violence is still commonplace, and it 
rarely shocks.
52
 So while juries may sympathize with the outraged jilted 
boyfriend who murders his ex-girlfriend, they generally seem less 
concerned that he murdered her for jilting him. Dressler acknowledges that 
the provocation claim does not absolve an individual of culpability; he 
only says that the actor should be less culpable than one who intentionally 
murders.
53
 But if the standard takes into account the actor’s delusions—
which are within the actor’s control—then there would be no justification 
for distinguishing between the two offenses in the first place. 
III. IMPLAUSIBILITY OF “LOST CONTROL” 
As we have seen, there are two aspects to the provocation defense: loss 
of control and adequate provocation. The crux of the defense is the loss-
of-control claim, at least for most supporting scholars.
54
 “Adequate 
provocation” is widely interpreted and subject to scrutiny.55 One should 
therefore examine whether a human being is physically and mentally 
capable of becoming so enraged that he or she loses control and would be 
capable of killing without desiring to do so. However, psychological and 
philosophical research do not support the possibility of such a loss of 
control. If loss of control is impossible, then when a jury does find 
provocation, the finding is always a false positive for loss of control.  
 
 
 52. The media does not frequently draw attention to it. Articles about murders often slyly 
reference that a man murdered his “estranged” wife or girlfriend. Abused women are at the highest risk 
of death or severe injury within a year after they leave the abusive relationship. See Darrell Payne & 
Linda Wermeling, Domestic Violence and the Female Victim: The Real Reason Women Stay!, 3 J. 
MULTICULTURAL, GENDER, & MINORITY STUD. 1, 3 (2009), available at http://www.scientific 
journals.org/journals2009/articles/1420.pdf 
 53. Dressler, Reflections, supra note 14, at 978–79. 
 54. Even Dressler, a proponent of the provocation doctrine, admits that if “adequate provocation” 
was predominant and the only function of the doctrine was to serve as a partial justification, then he 
would instead support its abolition. Id. at 970. 
 55. Some advocates seek to establish a more objective standard for “adequate provocation.” See 
generally Nourse, supra note 26. 
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Professor Stephen J. Morse
56
 discusses “loss of control” claims from a 
psychological and philosophical point of view. When an “internally 
coerced agent” is under emotional stress, making decisions may be 
difficult, but decisions to act remain under the actor’s control, even under 
the most difficult situations.
57
 Morse recognizes that “irrationality is the 
basis for excusing if threatening circumstances arising from internal 
circumstances prevent the agent from thinking rationally.”58 He concludes, 
in part, that “there is no defect in the will or volition, even if a person has 
intense, irrational desires that cause great dysphoria.”59 
In assessing the core of loss-of-control claims, Morse recognizes and 
asserts that the impulses at issue (in “irresistible impulse” claims) are 
desires. Anger creates an intense desire to punish an individual who has 
committed some wrong against the actor, and the actor may feel a need to 
satisfy the impulse to use violence.
60
 Denying that impulse creates a 
dysphoria that can perhaps only be eliminated by acting on the impulse at 
that moment.  
The American Psychiatric Association defines “compulsive behavior” 
as “purposeful,” “intentional,” and “designed to neutralize or to prevent 
discomfort or some dreaded event or situation . . . .”61 Morse observes that 
“‘[o]ut-of-control’ action is not necessarily unintentional action.”62 We 
simply equate a “hard choice” with “no choice,”63 perhaps because we 
seek to recognize human frailty and attempt to make room for it in the law. 
The agent did still choose to yield to the desire to act in whatever manner 
the impulse directed. One retains the choice between acting out of the 
impulse to relieve the dysphoria and not acting in a violent way while 
suffering through the dysphoria. While Morse does recognize that a 
nonculpably ignorant or irrational agent may not be aware that a choice is 
possible, that conception hinges on the defendant being ignorant or 
irrational. In that sense, loss of control is more plausible if it comes as a 
result of a mental deficiency. 
 
 
 56. Professor Morse is the Ferdinand Wakeman Hubbell Professor of Law at the University of 
Pennsylvania Law School and Professor of Psychology and Law in Psychiatry at the University of 
Pennsylvania School of Medicine. 
 57. Morse, supra note 10, at 1623. 
 58. Id. at 1624. 
 59. Id. at 1625. 
 60. Morse, supra note 10, at 1600. 
 61. Id. at 1603 (citation omitted). 
 62. Id. at 1595 (emphasis removed). 
 63. Id. at 1604. 
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According to Kahan and Nussbaum’s explanation of the “mechanistic 
conception” of emotion, “[e]motions feel like things that sweep over us, or 
sweep us away, or invade us, often without our consent or control—and 
this intuitive idea is well preserved in the view that they really are 
impulses or drives that go their own way without embodying reasons or 
beliefs.
”64
 We have a sense that emotions are “external to the self, forces 
that do something to ‘us’ without being . . . parts of what we think of as 
ourselves.”65 Anger, for example, “can seem to come boiling up from 
nowhere, in ways of which ‘we’ strongly disapprove.”66 Kahan and 
Nussbaum conclude, “for if we think of [our emotions] as drives or forces 
similar to currents of an ocean, we can imagine these natural forces as 
extremely strong without being troubled by questions about how our own 
thoughts could have such force.”67 
But it is the contrasting conception of emotion that dominates 
philosophy and psychology.
68
 This “evaluative conception” focuses on the 
fact that emotions involve evaluative thought. There is a distinction 
between feeling an emotion and acting on that emotion.
69
 As Aristotle 
claims, “changes in belief yields changes in emotions.”70 The “provoking” 
event does not automatically cause the actor to kill or fly into a rage. The 
event is processed in the actor’s belief system before the actor feels an 
emotion connected with the event. There is a middle step between the 
emotion and the act itself, which makes this relationship an evaluative 
process. 
Reid Griffith Fontaine, a professor in the Department of Psychology at 
the University of Arizona, has illuminated the scientific basis for the 
defense: Provocation Interpretational Bias (“PIB”). PIB means that an 
actor is biased toward interpreting social situations as provocative, or as 
threatening and hostile.
71
 Fontaine cites a multi-experiment investigation, 
 
 
 64. Kahan & Nussbaum, supra note 41, at 279–80 (footnote omitted). 
 65. Id. at 280. 
 66.  Id. 
 67. Id. 
 68. Id. at 286–87. 
 69. Id. at 288. 
 70. Id. at 282 (discussing Artistotle’s conception of the relations between emotions and beliefs); 
see also ARISTOTELIS, ARS RHETORICA 1382a, at 86–88 (Rudolfus Kassel ed., 1976). 
 71. Reid Griffith Fontaine, Reactive Cognition, Reactive Emotion: Toward a More 
Psychologically-Informed Understanding of Reactive Homicide, 14 PSYCHOL., PUB. POL’Y, & L. 243, 
250 (2008). PIB can range in seriousness, from actors who are only slightly more likely to perceive 
hostility in ambiguous situations to actors who attribute hostility in situations where the 
“provocateur’s” conduct was clearly benign. Id. 
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conducted in 2005 by Jack von Honk, which found that trait anger
72
 is 
automatically processed and is “positively associated with being biased 
toward attending to angry faces.”73 Fontaine suggests that this automatic 
process may contribute to an actor’s tendency to rashly perceive hostile 
situations during social situations.
74
 Fontaine admits that PIB is not an 
official mental disorder, yet he describes it as a “real, scientifically 
substantiated, nonculpable mental disturbance that diminishes rationality 
. . . .”75 PIB has also been associated with several mental disorders.76 
Elizabeth Escalona might certainly have suffered from a severe case of 
PIB. Defense counsel’s description of her life suggests that her life 
experiences would make her an excellent candidate for PIB (and for a loss-
of-control defense).
77
 If she had an extreme case of PIB, even a benign or 
ambiguous occurrence might seem to her like a major threat that would 
lead to a violent reaction. 
The main problem with viewing PIB as a scientifically substantiated 
reason for maintaining the provocation doctrine is that PIB fails to address 
the impulsive act of a defendant as “out of control.” Fontaine asserts that 
PIB should provide a valid excuse in provocation cases, because he 
assumes that quickened anger results in quickened action to exercise 
violence after that anger. PIB, however, relates to the generation of the 
anger without provocation. Thus, we are still left with a gap between the 
anger and the violent action.  
 
 
 72. Trait anger is defined as “the disposition to perceive a wide range of situations as annoying 
or frustrating, and the tendency to respond to such situations with more frequent elevations in state 
anger.” RAYMOND DIGIUSEPPE & RAYMOND CHIP TAFRATE, UNDERSTANDING ANGER DISORDERS 25 
(2010). 
 73. Fontaine, supra note 72, at 249 (citation omitted); see also Jack van Honk et al., Attentional 
Biases for Angry Faces: Relationships to Trait Anger and Anxiety, 15 COGNITION & EMOTION 279, 
279–97 (2001).  
 74. Fontaine, supra note 72, at 250. 
 75. Id. at 256. 
 76. Specifically, “individuals with borderline personality disorder (BPD) are . . . more sensitive 
to minor [provocations],” and some scholars have labeled BPD as a type of PTSD. Id. at 256–57. 
 77. Elizabeth Escalona did severely beat her child, and for a trivial reason at best. But why do we 
recognize “justified” (“reasonable”) outrage stemming from the discovery of one’s spouse in the act of 
adultery, yet ignore the frustrations of child-rearing? Our selective recognition of “reasonable rage” 
appears to perpetuate sex stereotypes that expect women to be nurturing and understanding of 
children’s mistakes. Other stereotypes dictate that we expect a jilted husband to be wrathful. I suggest 
that prosecutors ask jurors what they can see themselves doing in the defendant’s situation. I doubt 
they would actually envision themselves killing their spouse whom they find committing adultery. 
Provocation involves a great deal of jury discretion, and jurors’ decisions will be based on what they 
think and believe about themselves and their own capabilities. Imagining oneself as a juror and 
knowing the elements of the provocation doctrine is vital. 
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Aristotle contemplates “loss of control” in terms of voluntary versus 
involuntary actions:  
On some actions praise indeed is not bestowed, but pardon is, when 
one does a wrongful act under pressure which overstrains human 
nature and which no one could withstand. But some acts, perhaps, 
we cannot be forced to do, but ought rather to face death after the 
most fearful sufferings . . . .
78
  
Has the common law decided that one “cannot be forced to” murder? 
Aristotle’s comment points out the problem of societal praise of those who 
perform “good” acts and society’s reluctance to find one responsible for 
“evil” acts.79 Finding “loss of control” in provocation is all the more 
controverted, then, by the fact that the presence of “adequate justification” 
demands an evaluation of circumstances of which we may approve and 
therefore term “good” (e.g., anger at infidelity). There is an evil act of 
murder, over which the actor claims to have no control, but society also 
believes that it stems from “good” anger arising from “adequate” 
provocation. It is inconsistent to permit a claim to “loss of control” while 
at the same time recognizing “adequate” provocation. 
Aristotle further states: 
[A]cts done in the spur of the moment we describe as voluntary, but 
not as chosen. . . . [T]he incontinent man acts with appetite, but not 
with choice; while the continent man on the contrary acts with 
choice, but not with appetite. . . . Still less is it anger; for acts due to 
anger are thought to be less than any others objects of choice.
80
  
Aristotle attributes a lack of choice to the actions of an “incontinent” man, 
but not to a “reasonable” one, and for the incontinent Aristotle prescribes 
mercy and pity.
81
 The actor is said to lack self-control, and his 
incontinence is not necessarily limited to the particular act of which he is 
accused. Adopting Aristotle’s philosophical position, it would be more 
reasonable to allow a defendant to claim incontinence, or some form of 
mental disability, rather than provocation.   
 
 
 78. ARISTOTLE, THE NICOMACHEAN ETHICS 49 (David Ross trans., Oxford Univ. Press 1998). 
 79. Id. at 52. Similarly, Assistant Professor Susan Rozelle points out that “[t]reating criminal 
behavior as a sickness over which we have no control deprives us of the peculiarly human satisfactions 
that derive from a sense of achievement.” Rozelle, supra note 20, at 220 (internal marks omitted). 
 80. ARISTOTLE, supra note 79, at 53. 
 81. Id. at 49. 
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IV. THE REASONABLE MAN 
In January of 1979, Randall Dixon beat his fiancé to death after she 
danced with another man at a party celebrating their engagement. The jury 
returned a verdict of manslaughter. The judge decided that a reasonable 
jury could conceivably find that, “if a woman danced with another man at 
her engagement party . . . her behavior was a reasonable excuse for the 
anger that prompted him to kill her by beating her from that evening 
through five o’clock the following morning, and it merits a reduction in 
sentence.”82 
The provocation doctrine denies victims the “negative liberty” to 
further one’s abilities, lawfully live one’s life, form relationships, and 
work without hindrance from other individuals (specifically, aggressors 
and offenders).
83
 Instead, the doctrine recognizes that certain acts can 
“reasonably” lead to outrage and violent responses. Therefore, an 
assessment that an offender has been provoked means, to a certain extent, 
that the person instigating the provocation should have known that such 
instigating actions could provoke the violent reaction. When “justifiable 
provocation” is a partial defense for murder, the structure of the law 
results in victim blaming and fails to hold an offender responsible for his 
actions.
84
 The fact-finder adopts a definition of “reasonableness” that a 
jury would not apply to their own lives. Reasonableness in provocation 
excludes the rule of law and permits rage to rule. Our behavioral 
expectations are not based on what we would expect of ourselves, or on 
what we would expect from others, but upon what we perceive as reality.
85
 
That perception of reality and “fairness” is largely determined by the 
 
 
 82. Rozelle, supra note 20, at 202 (citing Dixon v. State, 597 S.W.2d 77, 78 (Ark. 1980)). 
 83. Alon Harel, The Triadic Relational Structure of Responsibility: A Defence, in CRIME, 
PUNISHMENT, AND RESPONSIBILITY: THE JURISPRUDENCE OF ANTONY DUFF 103, 114 (Rowan Cruft et 
al. eds., 2011). 
 84. A proponent might say “V assumed the risk of D’s murderous response when V provoked 
D.” See LARRY ALEXANDER, KIMBERLY KESSLER FERZAN & STEPHEN J. MORSE, CRIME AND 
CULPABILITY: A THEORY OF CRIMINAL LAW 163–64 (2009). Imprudence does not equate justification. 
Still, the provocation doctrine addresses imprudence in the form of “weakness of will” or “loss of 
control” which is learned, not irresistibly practiced. 
 85. This position is contrary to Rawls’ theory that reasonable persons 
are not moved by the general good as such but desire for its own sake a social world in which 
they, as free and equal, can cooperate with others on terms all can accept. They insist that 
reciprocity should hold within that world so that each benefits along with others. 
ROBERTO ALEJANDRO, THE LIMITS OF RAWLSIAN JUSTICE 76 (1998) (quoting JOHN RAWLS, 
POLITICAL LIBERALISM 50 (1993)). The reasonable thus embodies a basic morality that is a 
precondition of social life. Id.  
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jury’s imagination and stereotypical perceptions of the defendant who has 
killed. 
The reasonable person standard as applied to the provocation defense 
produces a warped vision of the offender’s reasonableness. The doctrine of 
provocation has moved from considering whether a reasonable defendant 
would have intended or foreseen his actions, to asking, “What would it 
have been reasonable to expect this defendant to intend, foresee, and 
know?”86 The doctrine has not yet considered “[w]hat it is reasonable to 
ask of this defendant.”87 Cultural factors often dictate the reasonableness 
of the defendant’s perceptions and our assessment of whether he had a fair 
opportunity to conform his actions to the law.
88
  
Only some provocations justify the use of the provocation defense.
89
 
The provocation must be one that would enrage a reasonable person and 
produce a situation in which the reasonable person would be expected to 
lose control and act in anger.
90
 The doctrine is inapplicable where the 
provocation is insufficient to cause a reasonable person to lose control. 
Markus Dubber writes that:  
The reference to reasonable firmness thus should not be confused 
with the general reference to reasonableness, or reasonable persons, 
in the case of justification defenses, or of negligence offenses. In the 
case of an excuse such as duress, the onlooker is to imagine himself 
in the actor’s position and to assess whether a person of reasonable 
firmness would have been able to act differently under the 
circumstances, even though it is undeniable that a reasonable 
person—that is, a person acting on an effective sense of justice—
would in fact have behaved differently. . . . [T]he defense instead 
turns on the question whether that failure was unavoidable—and 
therefore excusable, though not justifiable—given the triggering 
event . . . .
91
 
 
 
 86. Nicola Lacey, Community, Culture, and Criminalization, in CRIME, PUNISHMENT, AND 
RESPONSIBILITY: THE JURISPRUDENE OF ANTONY DUFF 303 (Rowan Cruft et al. eds., 2011). Lacey’s 
summary of the reasonable person standard should be linked to the “triad of responsibility” as outlined 
by Alon Harel. See Harel, supra note 84, at 104–05. Responsibility is a component of liability. Id. at 
104. 
 87. Lacey, supra note 87, at 303. 
 88. Id. 
 89. ALEXANDER ET AL., supra note 85, at 165. 
 90. Dressler, Reflections, supra note 14, at 987. 
 91. DUBBER, supra note 45, at 131. 
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The concept of shared human fallibility is what makes the excuse, not the 
ability to choose, the just course.
92
 The ordinary, reasonable person can 
control his actions and prevent himself from killing another, even in the 
face of “legally adequate” provocation.93 
An act is “voluntary” when it was subject to moral assessment. Kahan 
and Nussbaum’s evaluative conception assumes this condition is satisfied 
if conduct can be comprehensibly explained in terms of the actor’s beliefs. 
It may be impossible to comprehend all aspects of a “voluntary” act.94 This 
assumption underlies the approach taken by the MPC. Loss of control 
under provocation is a type of “impaired rationality” excuse.95 But it is 
doubtful that anyone can distinguish between an impulse that is truly 
“irresistible” and one that is simply “not resisted.”96 Common law murder 
analyses do not even require evidence of premeditation. “No time is too 
short . . . for a wicked man to frame in his mind his scheme of murder, and 
to contrive the means of accomplishing it.”97 Who can say that “heat of 
passion” crimes are not quickly contrived murders? 
V. UNCOVERING STEREOTYPES 
An angry person must generally believe that someone has deliberately 
wronged him “in a more than trivial way.”98 For such anger to exist, let 
alone take control, it sometimes accompanies remnants of controlling 
female sexuality within our culture. When a woman chooses to end a 
relationship or engages in infidelity, society accepts that a man feels jilted 
and believes that he has been severely wronged.
99
 But not every man 
believes that he is entitled to exclusive access to the woman he has chosen, 
 
 
 92. Id. Dubber writes: 
In this direct role-taking exercise, onlookers are to ensure that they “not impose[] on the actor 
who has the misfortune to confront a dilemmatic choice, a standard that his judges are not 
prepared to affirm that they should and could comply with if their turn to face the problem 
should arise. 
Id. (citations omitted). Furthermore, in the role-taking exercise, “matters of temperament are 
irrelevant.” Id. 
 93. Rozelle, supra note 20, at 232–33. 
 94. Kahan & Nussbaum, supra note 41, at 341. 
 95. ALEXANDER ET AL., supra note 85, at 155. 
 96. Id. at 157. 
 97. Kahan & Nussbaum, supra note 41, at 324 (quoting Commonwealth v. Drum, 58 Pa. 9, 16 
(1868) (emphasis omitted). 
 98. Id. at 283 (citing ARISTOTELIS, ARS RHETORICA 1385b-1386b, at 119–23 (Rudolfus Kassel 
ed., 1976)). 
 99. See supra Parts I and II. 
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even if she has ended (or perhaps never began) the relationship.
100
 Fewer 
still claim an irresistible urge to kill her as punishment. The law does not 
infringe on freedom of thought in society, but we generally expect people 
to conform their actions to the requirements of the law.
101
 
The loss-of-control defense is not confined to murder trials. Such 
claims are also made by men who abuse their wives or girlfriends. It is not 
uncommon to blame the women who are abused and to think that they 
must have done something to provoke their abuser. The notion that anger 
causes one to lose control and act violently is markedly dominated by 
intimate partner relationships in day-to-day circumstances. Feelings of 
entitlement define the cycle of violence in domestic abuse situations, and 
those same feelings may be present in murders where provocation is 
claimed as well. If loss of control is found to be absent in cases of 
domestic abuse, then the finding supports the claim that it is also absent in 
provocation claims (particularly for men who kill their partners).  
Lundy Bancroft, a therapist who specializes in counseling abusive men, 
sheds light on a major flaw in the claim that an abuser “lost control.” 
Bancroft asks clients who claim loss of control why they did not do 
something worse in their abuse. For example, Bancroft might say: 
You called her a fucking whore, you grabbed the phone out of her 
hand and whipped it across the room, and then you gave her a shove 
and she fell down. There she was at your feet, where it would have 
been easy to kick her in the head. . . . What stopped you?
102
 
The most frequent response he receives is, “Jesus, I wouldn’t do that. I 
would never do something like that to her.”103 Clients would always give 
him a reason; the response was almost never “I don’t know.”104 Bancroft’s 
experience with abusers has led him to conclude, “[a]n abuser almost 
never does anything that he himself considers morally unacceptable.”105 
 
 
 100. Susan Rozelle points out that 40% of married women and 50% of married men admit to 
having extramarital sex, and approximately 98–130 murders or non-negligent manslaughters involve 
some kind of “romantic triangle.” Rozelle, supra note 20, at 221. The statistics indicate that the “odds 
are good that many people have discovered their spouses to be committing adultery and yet refrained 
from killing them.” Id. at 221–22 (citation omitted). Likewise, for bar fights, the number of fights 
compared with the number of provoked killings associated with them also indicates that “most people 
manage to avoid killing their attackers when confronted with non-deadly force, as well.” Id. at 222. 
 101. Kahan & Nussbaum, supra note 41, at 288–310. 
 102. LUNDY BANCROFT, WHY DOES HE DO THAT? INSIDE THE MINDS OF ANGRY AND 
CONTROLLING MEN 34 (2002). 
 103. Id. 
 104. Bancroft received this response only twice in his fifteen years of counseling (as of 2002). Id. 
 105. Id. at 34–35. When a man is on an “abusive rampage,” his mind is processing a myriad of 
questions, including, “[a]m I doing anything that I myself consider too cruel, gross, or violent?” Id. 
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Despite a loss-of-control claim, abusers’ moral judgment was still 
present and prevented them from engaging in actions that would have been 
consistent with the claim that they were “out of control.” Men who abuse 
(or kill) do so when they feel entitled. An abuser’s sense of honor, for 
instance, may feel violated if a woman’s sexuality (perceived as their 
property) is taken from him, and that loss of honor fosters intense anger 
and dysphoria. This mentality is further demonstrated through past and 
present laws governing rape, which in some jurisdictions still make 
allowances for “property” rights of husbands.106  
As some scholars describe, society teaches women to expect men to 
behave like animals to a certain extent.
107
 This expectation invariably leads 
to victim blaming for crimes such as rape. Male aggression is considered a 
natural and expected response to attractive or provocatively-dressed 
females. Knowing this, women often exercise caution not to engender lust, 
or anger based on unfulfilled lust. Saying “no” to sex or ending a 
relationship can be seen as a “challenge to manhood.”108 Ending a 
relationship combines anger from not receiving sex—to which some 
abusers feel entitled—with the man’s perceived “property” rights as a 
husband, fiancé, or boyfriend. Voluntary manslaughter and “provocation” 
likewise continue to perpetuate a violent subordination of women by 
men.
109
 
Victims and aggressors are not the only individuals who have these 
warped perceptions. Society will generally chide a woman who has not 
taken the “proper precautions” for her negligence in allowing the man’s 
anger to take place. The perception of men as ferocious animals is 
widespread, and courts have even alluded to it in handing down rape 
judgments.
110
 It is therefore difficult to distinguish between “justified” 
violence and that which takes place after “provocation.” The two often go 
 
 
 106. See Dorothy E. Roberts, Rape, Violence, and Women’s Autonomy, 69 CHI.-KENT L. REV. 
359, 364 (1993) for a discussion of men’s entitlement to sexual control. 
 107. Id. at 379–80. “One does not go into the lion’s cage and expect not to be eaten.” Id. at 379 
(quoting Lois Pineau, Date Rape: A Feminist Analysis, 8 L. & PHIL. 217, 227–28 (1989)). When a 
woman does not take the “adequate precautions,” she is rebuked for recklessness, in a way, and 
blamed for whatever harm came to her. Id.  
 108. Id. at 380 
 109. Miller, supra note 22, at 668. 
 110. For example, in In re John Z, a rape case, the defense argued: 
By essence of the act of sexual intercourse, a male’s primal urge to reproduce is aroused. It is 
therefore unreasonable for a female and the law to expect a male to cease having sexual 
intercourse immediately upon her withdrawal of consent. It is only natural, fair and just that a 
male be given a reasonable amount of time in which to quell his primal urge . . . . 
60 P.3d 183, 187 (Cal. 2003). 
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hand-in-hand. Legal systems around the world use honor and passion to 
justify violence.
111
 Their rhetoric demonstrates a recognition that 
perceptions of honor lead to men acting like animals. One Jordanian man, 
jailed after killing his sister who had been raped, stated, “[i]f we lose 
[honor], we have no life, we become swine . . . . We’re no better than 
animals.”112 
In the Southern United States in the early twentieth century, the 
perceived honor of a perpetrator affected a criminal case’s outcome. This 
was particularly true as that character related to a victim’s sexual 
behavior.
113
 Today, violence is often allegedly “provoked” when women 
fail to fulfill stereotypes. This failure includes transgressing sexual 
boundaries, thereby implicitly dishonoring their significant others.
114
 
Abusive men today “claim to be provoked by their perception of the 
woman’s inadequacy as a home-maker/cook, by her ‘failure’ to respond 
sexually or to behave in a deferential manner . . . or because they believe 
her to be—or believe she desires to be—sexually unfaithful.”115 It is 
suspicious that perceptions of honor link so closely to what the law 
recognizes as “adequate” provocation (e.g., adultery), and juries’ 
perceptions most likely influence their findings. 
VI. JURIES’ INABILITY TO REASONABLY FIND PROVOCATION 
A jury is comprised of voting citizens in a community and typically 
reflects the demographics of the community. As such, it is highly unlikely 
that any individual on a jury has killed someone and then claimed 
provocation.
116
 Jurors therefore cannot directly and adequately 
empathize
117
 with a defendant who claims to have lost control and killed 
someone out of rage. While a juror may reasonably empathize with the 
 
 
 111. Johanna Bond, Honor as Property, 23 COLUM. J. GENDER & L. 202, 213 (2012). 
 112. Id. at 215 (internal quote marks omitted). 
 113. Id. at 213. This provoking sexual behavior would naturally include adultery or any other 
behavior deviating from accepted norms. 
 114. Id. at 214. 
 115. Id. at 214–15 (quoting Donna K. Coker, Heat of Passion and Wife Killing: Men Who 
Batter/Men Who Kill, 2 S. CAL. REV. L & WOMEN’S STUD. 71, 97 (1992).  
 116. If any juror had, that juror would most likely be in prison serving for voluntary manslaughter 
or murder, or simply be excluded from serving on a jury. 
 117. Empathy is “the action of understanding, being aware of, being sensitive to, and vicariously 
experiencing the feelings, thoughts, and experience of another of either the past or present without 
having the feelings, thoughts, and experience fully communicated . . . .” MERRIAM-WEBSTER, 
available at http://www.m-w.com/dictionary/empathy. 
https://openscholarship.wustl.edu/law_jurisprudence/vol6/iss2/5
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feeling of anger, hurt, or sadness, he or she could not empathize with the 
rage that prompts a killing.
118
 
The main question in assessing a provocation claim is “whether the 
actor’s loss of self-control can be understood in terms that arouse 
sympathy in the ordinary citizen.”119 Having most likely experienced 
anger, hurt, and sadness, the average juror might be able to sympathize
120
 
with a defendant’s general emotions after being provoked. But still, no 
juror has shared the defendant’s murderous reaction to the given 
provocation. 
How then can a jury decide that a provoked individual “reasonably” 
lost control when he killed if those on the jury have never lost control and 
killed another? Only by the stereotypes ingrained in our culture.
121
 Jurors 
may not agree or see themselves behaving as the defendant did, but 
prevailing stereotypes leave room for the anger of jealous or insulted male 
jurors who are “entitled” to their “property.” Jurors’ imaginations are 
driven by those stereotypes that prompt them to believe that they should 
sympathize with the defendant. An inquiry into reasonableness is, after all, 
“an exercise in imaginative role taking . . . .”122 Justice requires, however, 
that judges and juries “apply the same standard to the defendant that they 
would apply to themselves . . . .”123 
If a jury applied to their own lives notions of reasonable reactions to 
“adequate” provocations, then these stereotypes might loosen their 
stronghold on jurors’ imaginations. If any one of them was asked whether 
he or she could imagine killing his or her spouse out of rage (for any 
 
 
 118. Many jury members might have experienced insults from others that prompted an amount of 
rage, perhaps even violence. If a jury member has experienced the anger of finding his or her spouse in 
the act of adultery, or feeling jilted by a girlfriend or boyfriend, then he or she is in an advantageous 
position for the defendant and would be more likely to understand the level of anger that the defendant 
might have felt. 
 119. Garvey, supra note 1, at 1690 (citation omitted). 
 120. Sympathy is “an affinity, association, or relationship between persons or things wherein 
whatever affects one similarly affects the other,” or “an inclination to think or feel alike.” MERRIAM-
WEBSTER, available at http://www.m-w.com/dictionary/sympathy. 
 121. See supra Part V. 
 122. DUBBER, supra note 45, at 128. Dubber also states: 
The onlooker’s normative judgment of the defendant’s choice or nonchoice under these 
circumstances turns on her ability and willingness to draw on her sense of justice in two 
respects, by recognizing the defendant as a fellow person with a capacity for a sense of justice 
and by then placing herself imaginatively in the defendant’s position as best she can given the 
information available to her in order to determine whether the defendant exercised that 
capacity (in the case of justification), or couldn’t fairly have been expected to exercise it (in 
the case of an excuse). 
Id. at 132–33. 
 123. Id. at 132.  
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reason), the answer would unlikely be in the affirmative. Likewise, if one 
asked jurors whether they would expect their respective spouses to kill 
them if the spouse found them in the act of adultery, even fewer positive 
answers would abound.
124
 
Thus, the application of the provocation defense hinges on what the 
average juror believes is a sufficient provocation. Unfortunately, this 
cannot be expected to produce just results. While the doctrine intends to 
represent the experiences of the jury, the outcome actually depends on 
what the jury believes could reasonably be the case for the defendant. This 
analysis does not necessarily involve jurors putting themselves in the place 
of the defendant or the victim. One may lose control and lack the element 
of “choice” at a slight provocation to which jury members could not 
imagine themselves responding in kind. In those instances, the jury is 
more likely to consider the actor a “monster” and refrain from exercising 
the pity or mercy of which Aristotle spoke.
125
 
Does a jury expect a reasonable man whose ex-girlfriend starts seeing 
another man to become enraged and kill her? Surely not. Yet by 
considering the mentality of the offender, the provocation defense partially 
justifies such actions. The mentality of the offender includes any delusions 
the perpetrator had prior to the act. His obsession with the victim is also 
taken into account and serves to provide a “reasonable justification” for 
his actions. But for Elizabeth Escalona, her years of hardship offered 
inadequate justification for her to demonstrate outrage toward her child. 
This juxtaposition is problematic because it hinges on whether a 
reasonable jury can relate to the actions of the defendant (or whether a 
reasonable jury believes that the defendant’s actions were expectedly 
reasonable). Even if women on a jury cannot imagine themselves 
murdering an adulterous partner, they may still find such a response from 
a man to be “reasonable.” 
Before the provocation defense was legally recognized or presented in 
jury instructions, there were times when a jury would deny a murder 
conviction outright and would completely excuse the killing on the basis 
of self-defense. In such instances, the jury believed that the requisite intent 
to murder was absent and that the defendant had lost control over his 
actions. This occurred during the medieval era. In such cases, “juries felt 
so strongly that a defendant should not be charged with felonious 
homicide . . . when the killing occurred out of provoked rage that they 
 
 
 124. Asking such questions and prompting members of a jury to consider their actual expectations 
in their own relationships might indeed help reason to prevail over stereotypes. 
 125. See ARISTOTLE, supra note 79, at 53. 
https://openscholarship.wustl.edu/law_jurisprudence/vol6/iss2/5
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creatively reworked the history of the incident so that the defendant’s 
crime may be entirely excused.”126 
On one level, this evidence of juries’ insistence on excusing a crime 
may indicate the strength with which they believed the defendant to be out 
of control at the time of the murder. However, sexist stereotypes would be 
the cause of such jury decisions. The stereotypes of male entitlement and 
honor, and of women as property were even more prominent and pervasive 
in medieval times than they are now. Furthermore, the medieval jury was 
comprised of a “select group of local men who were believed to have 
knowledge of the defendant and the alleged crime.”127 Imagine an all-male 
jury, the members of which were all acquainted with the defendant. Their 
strong belief that a fellow citizen was not guilty of murder is not very 
convincing when it comes to the question of whether a person can actually 
lose control over his actions to the point of killing someone. 
CONCLUSION 
The doctrine of provocation—besides being fraught with inconsistency 
and imbalanced application—hinges on patriarchal stereotypes, which 
should be extracted from the legal system as thoroughly as possible. The 
doctrine lacks a strong basis in scientific evidence, and its continued use in 
criminal jurisprudence is proof that female equality has yet to be achieved. 
Our culture unfortunately continues to tolerate violence resulting from 
men’s anger, frequently because it assumes men’s anger as a fact of life—
one which should be expected and which may foreseeably result in 
violence, if a man is provoked. 
Although fact-finders must consider the actions of a “reasonable 
person” in a murder case, the infrequency with which “loss of control” is 
actually claimed indicates that “reasonable people” would not lose control 
and kill a person who has (even greatly) wronged them. Defenders of the 
doctrine claim that it makes room for normal “human frailty,” yet no juror 
is likely to identify with a defendant who killed as a result of an anger-
induced partial incapacity. 
Furthermore, the arbitrary division between “adequate” and 
“inadequate” provocation encourages the stereotypical expectation that 
particular provocations “reasonably” lead to the exercise of violence. The 
doctrine is not simply a separate alternative to finding murder for lack of 
the requisite “intent”; the cause of the defendant’s rage must be 
 
 
 126. Fontaine, supra note 72, at 244. 
 127. Id. 
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“reasonable” to the jury. Supporters of the doctrine often refer to it as a 
partial excuse because of the partial incapacity that takes place. The 
doctrine is both a partial excuse and a partial justification, however, 
because the requirement of adequate provocation suggests that the victim 
should have somehow expected the agent to become enraged. The 
arbitrary division between provoked individuals and those whom we label 
“monsters” demonstrates a critical weakness in the doctrine.  
If the provocation doctrine is to be abolished, there is a potential 
problem that we must address. Given the history of provocation and the 
fact that a large segment of the population probably agrees with Garvey’s 
assessment, juries will likely attempt to accommodate “ordinary human 
frailty.” As the medieval jury would often warp the facts to allow for the 
claim of self-defense when a murder was committed in the “heat of 
passion,” today’s jury might have difficulty finding a defendant guilty of 
murder if they believe that the defendant was sufficiently provoked and 
lacked the necessary intent.
128
 At common law the crime of murder 
requires a mens rea of “malice aforethought.”129 Likewise, the Model 
Penal Code states that “criminal homicide constitutes murder when: (a) it 
is committed purposely or knowingly; or (b) it is committed recklessly 
under circumstances manifesting extreme indifference to the value of 
human life.”130  
Complications may also arise if the provocation doctrine is eliminated 
without modifying the elements of murder. A jury might not wish to find 
malice aforethought if the only alternative to a murder conviction is an 
acquittal. Juries in those cases might be more inclined to acquit the 
defendant rather than find him guilty of murder. Further research is needed 
to present a proposal for jury instructions that clearly define intent so that 
it includes heat of passion crimes. 
Such a goal might be difficult, but these are difficulties worth 
overcoming. The eradication of the provocation defense will allow 
criminal jurisprudence to extricate itself from flawed cultural stereotypes. 
 
 
 128. This risk might not be significant, given the broad strokes with which the judiciary insists 
that premeditation needs no particular time frame. Furthermore, there is evidence that juries and courts 
across the nation have rejected the notion of adultery as provocation (one of the main historical 
claims), so the attitudes of juries may be shifting regardless of whether provocation is eliminated as a 
claim. See Rozelle, supra note 20, at 204. Nevertheless, stereotypes may still induce juries to continue 
recognizing a lack of intent in loss-of-control claims. 
 129. WILLIAM J. STUNTZ & JOSEPH L. HOFFMANN, DEFINING CRIMES 621 (2011). 
 130. MODEL PENAL CODE § 210.2. 
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